

# Global, Hybrid or Multiple?

## *Cultural Identities in the Age of Satellite TV and the Internet*

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### **Globalization-impacts of Satellite TV and the Internet**

There is a strong presumption by many that first satellite TV in the 1990s and now the Internet in the new millennium has begun to strongly globalize people's identities. However, many questions lurk behind this surface of apparent change. What is truly easily available to people, not only in physical access, but also in terms of effective access to understand or enjoy? How many new information and entertainment sources are truly global, versus transnational, national, regional and local? What are people actually choosing to read and watch amongst all these new options?

What structural, economic, cultural and other factors guide people's choices as they choose among all the new possibilities? What is the role of cultural history, language and proximity? What has been shared historically and what is coming to be shared now, in part through the new media themselves? What impacts do global media have compared to national, regional or other media have upon culture? In a larger sense, what impacts do today's global media have on people's identities and how should we understand both those impacts and the identities themselves in this new world? And what impacts to all of these phenomena and have on the structuring of cultural spaces and markets in at local, national, regional and global levels?

The movement from traditional local life to modern interaction with mass media has produced identities that are already multilayered with cultural geographic elements that are local, regional (subnational but larger than the very local), transnational based on cultural-linguistic regions, and national (Anderson, 1983). In this study, we argue that new media users around the world continue to strongly reflect these layers or aspects of identity while many also acquire new layers of identity that are transnational, or global. In this paper, we examine the relationship between processes of hybridization of identity and culture over time and the buildup, maintenance, and even defense of various layers of multilayered identities. These layers of identity are articulated with a variety of media, such as television and the Internet, but not in a simple sense of being primarily influenced by media. Some layers of identity, such as those religious traditionalists hold, may actively resist many of the ideas most television channels and Internet sites and messages carry.

These increasingly multilayered identities are articulated with a variety of changing structures. As we shall see below, social class and geography strongly structures who can access what new channels. Further, the media institutions themselves are becoming

more complexly multilayered, even as they reach further geographically. Models, such as commercial TV networks globalize, but are also localized and regionalized as they engage the specific histories and institutions of a variety of cultures, media traditions and regulatory systems. Because of these kinds of adaptations and localizations, another notable theoretical strand we shall use here is hybridity. In our model, hybridity and multi-layeredness coexist and interact. Layers like the institutions, program genres, and audience identities for public service co-exist with layers for commercial networks, genres and audiences. Both can acquire and maintain substantial solidity, but both are also changing, in part as they interact with and change each other. One case, we will consider below, the global expansion of Discovery and similar networks, takes documentary and other genres from public service television and hybridizes them, or as many would say, waters them down, into a new global commercial form.

### **Cultural Sedimentation: Layers and Mixtures / Hybrids**

In my own work, particularly a number of in-depth interviews within Brazil, and from Austin to the Texas border with Mexico, I find a process of hybridity as well as a process of the formation, maintenance, occasional collapse, and recent proliferation of multiple layers of identity and corresponding layers of media use. I articulate this as a dual process. As an observer in Brazil, for instance, I perceive cultural hybridity taking place in a certain situation. However, I rarely interview people who see themselves as culturally hybrid. On the other hand, I frequently find myself interviewing people who articulate their identity as a series of spaces or layers. In both Brazil and Texas, I find people who articulate very clearly a local sense of self, a regional sense of self, a national sense of self, some interest or knowledge of the global, a social class sense of self, a religious sense of self, an ethnic and/or linguistic sense of self, a professional, and an educational sense of self.

So in my work, I'm moving toward what we might see as a kind of sedimentary model in which layers of meaning, culture, identity, and media use form and persist. New layers form over the top of all others as structural circumstances permit or even dictate. Sometimes when we look at people, for instance, we are likely to see the newest layer as strongest. For many observers when they look at culture these days, they see on top a new layer of what they might call globalization. So seeing this as a new layer, there is a supposition that this is perhaps now the dominant layer, perhaps homogenizing all the others. Or perhaps even the dominant aspect of someone's identity or experience. However, if we were looking at a highway cut or a river canyon someplace, we see the layers from the side. We realize that there are recent layers, which are important, but they've built up over older layers.

One problem with the geological analogy for this is that it seems to imply that the layers persist as separate. But as in geology, the layers often interact. They sometimes break down and form new layers out of the pre-existing ones. Even more in culture, I think we will see that these layers interact with each other so that as one becomes globalized a certain part of one's life, such as one's education or profession, one finds that inevitably in dialogue with one's local interests, musical preferences, or even religious or philosophical interests. One could have a rich metaphor to work with for the ongoing nature of change. Too many systems either overstate change, as in the very strong cultural imperialism hypothesis, or in contrast, understate change, as in some globalization hypotheses in which everything forms separate pockets and simply persists.

I don't think any of those are quite adequate for understanding the complexity of what we see as people do use new forms of media to interact, forming new layers and levels of identity. But they continue also to think in terms of older layers of identity, interest and media use, as well.

### **Multiple Media Spaces of Production, Flow, Identification**

In this paper, I would like to more clearly articulate a map of some of the different forms and layers of interaction that are frequently put together under the idea of globalization. I want to define some of those layers more narrowly and carefully. At the same time, I would like to map out, as a heuristic beginning, the kinds of layers of production, flow and identity that I see emerging. Some of this map comes from examining the production process, some from extensive mapping I have recently done of television flows (Straubhaar 2007), and much comes from interviews with a variety of audience members in Brazil and Texas conducted by me and my students at UT. Following is a map, or typology of layers from the most global down to the local.

- Global infrastructures of technology, finance and media models that structure more specific layers of production, flow and identification below.
- A U.S. "empire" based on Hollywood structural & cultural power, itself becoming a transnational network of co-production (Miller, et al).
- Other global exporters – Latin American producers of telenovelas, Japanese anime, Bollywood, etc.
- Transnational cultural-linguistic producers, markets and audiences – geographically separated former colonies and diasporic migrants, English, French, Portuguese-speaking.
- Geo-cultural regional producers, markets and audiences – geographically linked cultures with common or similar languages, shared histories, and geographic proximity, like the Nordic countries, the Arab World, Greater China, and Latin America.
- Translocal producers, markets and audiences – cross borders into India from Hong Kong, into the USA from Mexico, etc. (Kumar, et al).
- National producers, markets and audiences – of enormous variety, from powerful states like China, which push Rupert Murdoch around, to failed states like Somalia.
- Regional producers, markets and audiences – smaller than states, perhaps lapping across borders, like the cultural region and border zone between Monterrey, Mexico to Austin, Texas.
- Metropolitan producers, markets and audiences – global cities or media capitals (Curtin), which are directly linked to global networks, and produce for themselves, regions, nations or transnational spaces.
- Local producers, markets and audiences – at the level of the smaller city, municipality or even neighborhood.

## The Importance of Cultural Geography

If we examine this list of layered producers, markets and audiences more carefully, we can see historical and geographic patterns of development that put global developments into a more nuanced perspective. We are beginning to recognize that markets and services are not simply or clearly defined by technology, or by corporate ambition, but also by culture, uses, and identities and how they layer over time. Many of these culturally defined markets and identity reflect pre-global layers of culture. These include many of the most powerful layers of both media and identity.

The dominant cultural forces for most people seem to have been originally local and regional. People thought of themselves primarily in terms of villages, local dialects, perhaps tribes or clans. It took well into the 1700s for most Frenchmen to speak French in one of the earliest nations to be defined as such (Weber 1976). Now, based on my interviews in Brazil, even the most globe-hopping businessman or academic usually still has a very local identity as well. A neighborhood they live in, other neighborhoods they go to for work or pleasure. They prize local restaurants, music clubs and scenes, nightclubs, museums, bookstores, all the many places that in a very physical and spatial sense tend to give life local context and local pleasure. These are linked to personal networks, but in media terms, also local music scenes, local radio, local newspapers, festivals, and performances.

For many people, there are regional layers of identity and regional layers of media, which are smaller than the nation, but larger than the very local. Many of these regional foci depend on language variation. Very important cultural and linguistic regions from Catalans in Spain to the Kurds to Mayan language speakers in southern Mexico to a variety of regional language groups in India still have strong layers of quite separate identities from the nation states that contain them. They also often have ethnic, cultural, and religious differences with national majority populations. They usually have their own music traditions and scenes (O'Connor 2002), and histories, which are often intense focuses of identification. Sometimes hundreds of millions in very large nations like India speak local or regional languages linked to regional cultures, film industries, broadcasters, etc.

In many ways these regional groups below the nation state are based on cultural linguistic groups that predate the nation state in very real and effective ways. The USA, for instance, is spending tens of billions of dollars time trying to prop up a nation state in Iraq, echoing the British efforts to create such a state earlier in the 20th century. However, the likely fate of Iraq is to disintegrate into the three pieces in which it existed in under the Ottoman Empire (LOC 2007): a Kurdish area, Sunni Arab area based in around the capital city, and a largely Shiite area in the south. So these old ethnic groups, languages, empires, and religions have a great deal to do with major layers of identity that many of us hold very tight and important.

Another strong set of pre-national and pre-global cultural forces are what I call geo-cultural, based on cultural-linguistic groups that precede the European colonization of the late 1400s on. These are based on older ethnic groups, languages, empires, and religions, in places like the Nordic countries, Greater China, Arab World, and South Asia. Some cultural forces and identities that remain very powerful date from before most nation-states, from colonial empires, migrations, languages, religions, and racial mixtures, in Latin America, Franco- and Luso-phone Africa, in the USA, and other Anglophone nations, such as Australia or Canada (Abram 2004). In some ways, many of the cultural roots of Nordicom date from the common, pre-national roots of Nordic

cultures. Scandinavia has a certain geographical coherence and contiguity, as well as shared historical, cultural linguistic, ethnic, dynastic or political, and religious roots, of geo-linguistic (Sinclair 1999) or geo-cultural layers of understanding and identification (Straubhaar 2005).

I have several times attended the meetings of another academic group, based on common language and culture, very different than Nordicom, the Association of Portuguese speaking media researchers (Lusocom), from Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, and Brazil, along with much smaller places like East Timor. There can be meaningful associations widely spread geographically but linked by language, culture and history, colonial experience, and now academic interaction that build common literatures, etc. They are more far-flung geographically far-flung groupings such as the Portuguese speaking world or the English-speaking world. I distinguish them from the geo-cultural by calling them cultural linguistic transnational spaces.

While the roots of these geo-cultural and transitional cultural linguistic layers of culture predated both the nation-state and globalization, they were reinforced by many of the new forces, particularly in technology and economics that we associate with globalization. Just as we see growth in parts of the Hollywood coverage of the world, we see often rapid growth in cultural linguistic and geocultural spaces and markets in television exports (Straubhaar 2007), satellite/cable TV, Internet sites, music and movie downloads.

However, many if not most people who've lived in the last two centuries have interacted with modern national educational systems in which textbooks and teaching norms are discussed and prescribed at a national level. They have also grown up with national media, whether commercial or the kinds of public broadcasting systems common in northern Europe at the national level. They often deal with other nationalizing forces, national churches in some cases, national labor unions, national sport teams, and all the things that in many ways are articulated with a certain sense of nationalism.

National cultural forces (Anderson, 1983) are linked to novels, national newspapers, national radio and television, and in some cases to national film and music. Anderson shows those national cultures and national media are not a given and they are slowly and often carefully constructed over time. Sometimes cultural elements have been deliberately used by governments, or national romantic artists to reinforce national identity, such as the 1800s use of Kalevala runot in Finland, or the 1890s use of Snorri Sturluson's Sagas of the Norse Kings to help create modern Norwegian identity, or the 1930s to present use of music in Brazil to define national identity.

### **New Global Layers of Cultural Identification**

Audiences around the world also acquire new layers of identity or identification corresponding to new global layers of production and flow of media, enabled by new structural forms of political economy, and new forms and models of media. Forming one of the main new global layers, Hollywood dominated the flow of film to most world markets (Miller 2001) and at least initially dominated the flow of television, as well (Nordenstreng and Varis 1974). So by sheer dint of exposure, American culture began to seem as a familiar second culture to many people (Gitlin 2001), particularly in Western Europe and the Anglophone countries where the U.S. presence was often most notable (Straubhaar 2007). It was linked over the years, to film, television exports, satellite/cable TV channels, and music, part of what a recent turn in political economy research calls a

new sort of virtual empire by the USA (Hardt and NEGRI 2001). However, many people around the world were more lightly touched by this U.S. layer than others, depending on location, social class, language, religion, and other aspects of identity that led them to discount the U.S. output and choose to watch other things (Hoskins and Mirus 1988).

There are also renewed and expanded transnational layers, as noted above, at both cultural-linguistic and geocultural levels that utilize many of the same technologies as do U.S. and other global productions and flows. Books have flowed among language and religious groups for millennia. The Bible and Koran helped expand large areas of shared religious identification and at least in the case of the Koran, considerable Arabic language hegemony as well in the Mid-East and North Africa. Mass media like radio, cinema and television helped consolidate and renew language and cultural groupings. Since the mid-1990s, research by Sinclair and others (1996) have highlighted the growing importance of cultural linguistic markets. Research on the role of satellite TV in the Arab World (Kraidy 2002) shows how new refinements in technology can continue to facilitate and reinforce such identities.

At least in television, the U.S. and new transnational flows are heavier, but there are also new layers of other global production and flow or access, such as the worldwide flows of Latin American telenovelas, Japanese anime on film and television, Hong Kong kung fu film and television, and Bollywood films, among others. The scope of these flows, especially compared to Hollywood exports, has been contested (Biltereyst and Meers 2000) but they have grown into visible new options for those who have access to them. We can also see some new global flows of news (with new operations like Al-Jazeera in English), feature films (especially those co-produced with Hollywood), music, and some Internet sites, like YouTube. There are new forms that seemed to be global in ways that we've perhaps not yet thought how to articulate, such as the way young people in many countries now interact in English via technologies like massive multiple online role playing games like World of Warcraft.

### **Global Stratification of New Media Access and Use**

Next, perhaps, to consider is that the world of global media, particularly the new media, is a very stratified place. Many people do not have access to the new tools and channels that carry some of the layers described above. Even though we are speaking today in Scandinavia, where Internet access and multi-channel TV access is as high as anywhere in the world, many places exist, particularly in Africa and South Asia, where access to even simple broadcast TV and radio is still quite limited.

In some ways people in North America and in Scandinavia live in what Mattelart (2002) has described as a global archipelago or a 'techno-apartheid' global economy (p. 607) of those included in the information rich global economy, concentrated in the rich countries of the European Union, North America, Australia/New Zealand, and parts of East Asia, but in which almost 80 percent of the world's population is excluded (Mattelart 2002, p. 608). That global archipelago of high incomes and connectivity tends to have very high Internet, satellite, cable TV, advanced mobile phone, and other new media access and use. This archipelago is, in some ways, a unique place where people find it easier to pursue global topics, whether it is on numerous forms of television, the Internet, audio accessed through the Internet, mobile devices, or other channels. Its infrastructure is now in many ways beginning to converge together on the Internet. Most people in it have both physical access to an Internet connection and the education,

cultural capital and social capital that enables them to use it skillfully for their own interests. Majorities of users in at least the major urban parts of this archipelago have access to broadband Internet.

Broadband penetration is a good indicator of the broad outlines of the archipelago of the highly connected. An International Telecommunication Report gives the broad outlines (ITU 2007, p. 9):

Today, however, broadband penetration is dominated by the wealthy countries. Some 70 per cent, or nearly three-quarters, of broadband subscribers worldwide in 2006, were located in high-income countries which accounted for just 16 per cent of world population. Furthermore, two economies – India and Vietnam – accounted for more than 95 per cent of all broadband subscribers in low-income countries, while a single economy – China – accounted for 94 per cent of broadband subscribers in the lower-middle income group (Figure 1.2). The good news is that a number of developing countries are experiencing broadband growth. In Peru, for example, the number of broadband subscribers has grown by close to 80 per cent annually between 2001 and 2006, from 22'779 in 2001 to 484'899 at the end of 2006. In Europe, over half the Estonian population uses the Internet and the country has the highest penetration of both Internet and broadband in Central and Eastern Europe. But in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), there were merely 46'000 broadband subscribers in the 22 out of 50 LDCs with broadband service in 2006. (ITU, 2007, p. 9)

However, even within nations considered to be part of the global high tech archipelago, people with less education have lower access and less profitable usage of their connectivity (Mattelart, 2002). People who live in rural areas or people who simply do not possess the cultural capital or group habitus, in the terms framed by Pierre Bourdieu (1984), do not necessarily have the interest, wherewithal or ability to follow the same patterns as even their urban or more educated compatriots within the archipelago. The Pew Internet studies in the USA have noted that a number of people do not know enough to use the Internet enjoyably and others perceive it as outside their interests and personal repertoires of entertainment and information.

Outside the global archipelago, there is another new model to the world's connectivity. Many of the larger developing countries, such as Brazil, Russia India and China, and other large-scale developing countries are heavily pursued by many of the ICT equipment and content marketers of the world because they have large numbers of Internet and satellite TV users. But they are internally stratified. For example, while perhaps 5-10% of Brazil uses the Internet avidly with high speed connectivity, another 5-10% struggles to get access in public places or with low bandwidth home connections, and 80% don't use it at all (Spence and Straubhaar, forthcoming). Most use it with only partial understanding of the tools, frequently frustrated by connectivity. So, many developing country elite users come forth and join the global archipelago described earlier but many more in their populations are excluded. Many don't even know they are excluded.

There is yet another world in most of Africa, and much of Asia, the Arab World and Latin America, where almost all people are excluded but there is a very small globalized elite of new media users in certain companies, parts of some urban areas, and a few NGOs and educational institutions. This world excludes 90% or more of all potential users of both the Internet and other new media like satellite TV or cable TV.

There is another pattern that splits Internet use from in satellite and cable TV, especially in some countries like India and much of the Middle East. While the Internet remains restricted, satellite and/or cable TV have become truly mass media in some countries, like India (Sinclair 2005). Structural changes have been made within satellite and cable TV to reduce prices so that cable in a major Indian city may cost under five dollars a month. In most of these situations, however, a parallel structural change has been made to focus on regional, translocal, geocultural or transnational channels that target the population in question with its own culture (Kumar 2006). Major efforts have been made to localize or regionalize satellite and cable TV, challenging another aspect of its assumed globalization.

### **The Really Existing Uses of Satellite Technology**

The existing uses of satellite TV technology are very plural: global, transnational, translocal, and national. There are a number of global channels, as we shall see below, but most of them are adapted, at least minimally, to targeted regions and nations.

There are some truly global satellite and cable TV channels, such as CNN, MTV, HBO, ESPN, Discover, Disney, BBC, Nickelodeon and Cartoon Channel. However, we need to understand exactly how these are structured and exactly how they operate. Some, like HBO, remain highly centralized with regional offices making a selection among American material to figure out what would be most regionally appropriate and would not affect local sensibilities. So that a Singapore office of HBO seems to exercise some degree of choice and moral censorship over what's available on the HBO broadcast into Singapore, Malaysia and its region, but it is still a very globalized channel. On the other hand, some global icons like MTV have gained extensive popularity and commercial success precisely by localizing its genre forms of video clip, VJ, and youth-oriented reality shows into national and regional versions. The tendency seems to be in the latter direction.

Nearly all global channels have done the minimal localization of translation and dubbing. Those that do not so extensively, like CNN, remain locked in small, if elite, parts of the English language archipelago, with very small audiences by TV standards, as Colin Sparks (1998) and others have noted. Some popular specialty channels do a little more than dubbing, such as Discovery and Cartoon Channel. They do local culture based transitions, promotions, and appeals to draw local audiences towards what remains largely globalized programming (Chalaby 2005). These channels are most popular among specific niches, such as educationally aspiring middle classes or children, as we shall see below. Many channels, particularly in music, sports, news, television drama, etc. find they have to localize more in order to compete effectively with more culturally specific transnational and national channels. There is a tendency for such channels to first regionalize and then focus increasingly on national situations that require more specificity in order to achieve a decent audience to become profitable (Curtin, forthcoming).

The example of Murdoch in Asia is interesting. He initially tried to cover all of Asia with five television channels: MTV Asia, a BBC channel, Prime Sports out of Denver, Star Plus entertainment and culture, and a single Mandarin language channel. He rapidly discovered that he had to go to much more national and now has over 50 channels aimed at various specific places, specific culture regions and nations with various specific lineups. He is continuing to subdivide and localize further everyday.

Some of the fiercest competition for Murdoch and other would-be global titans comes from new transnational channels that work within cultural spaces or markets, defined



by language and culture. Many of these are geo-cultural. They work within culture and language defined spaces of contiguous nations that share not only languages but pre-colonial cultural and historical commonalities, in areas such as Greater China or the Arab World, or colonial common languages and histories, such as Latin America. Some are transnational cultural-linguistic spaces, such as the English- or Portuguese-speaking cultural spaces or markets, spread across the globe but unified by colonial languages, shared histories, and often by new post-colonial cultural exporters, like the USA in the Anglophone world, or Brazil in the Lusophone world. Networks targeting these more specific cultural spaces seem have an advantage, which we cover more below, over more global, but also more culturally distant broadcasters. Al-Jazeera beats CNN so completely in the Arab World in part by the cultural specificity or proximity of its news approach, framed within a more specific set of commonly held values and traditions.

Other strong competitors to global corporations are either national or translocal. In India, there are a number of translocal (targeting the local or national from outside it) commercial India-oriented satellite channels that come in from outside India. There are increasing numbers of local and regional channels, based out of the pre-existing local and regional film industries. These show both the existing stocks of films from regional language film industries and also create new television programs in regional Indian languages (Kumar 2006). So while the technology of satellite TV has spread out in the 1990s into a number of places, in many cases it has been used for rather traditional purposes to break open an existing broadcast television monopoly, as in India, Turkey or Iran (Semati 2006) or other places where government control over national television remains quite strong. In these instances, a new phenomenon of trans-local TV is arisen, which permits those who wish to reach those cultures markets and polities to do so via satellite TV from outside (Kumar 2006). On the other hand, satellite TV content is not what one would have anticipated as global from the U.N. debates in the 1960s or 1970s on satellites (Katz 1977). It seems pretty much organized within cultures and languages already known to people. It is frequently marketing goods, ideas, or even religions or political parties that they're already quite familiar. In some ways these are alternative national or regional channels using satellite or cable technology to come in from outside, much more translocal than global.

Many of these same channels also target diasporic populations in a truly global way. Both translocal "national" and regional language channels from India follow migrants to North America, Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. Some national channels, like Chinese Central TV in English, or transnational versions of geo-cultural channels, like Al-Jazeera in English, now intend to grow from a specific national or regional base to more global roles and to an audience beyond the ones constituted by migrants from their regions.

However, an even earlier and perhaps even more widespread use of satellite TV in many places, starting with India, the Soviet Union and the United States, was simply to use the satellite to bring new channels internally to the entire national polity or market. Most of the people in small town or rural Brazil who watch television do so via a signal carried from a satellite transmitter and rebroadcast in their small town or rural area. These retransmitters may have been put up by a national network, by local advertisers, or most likely, by a mayor who saw bringing national television to town as a strong benefit to his electorate (and a good way to get re-elected). In many ways, satellite dishes coupled with re-transmitters were indeed public works programs in many parts of the world from the 1980s and 1990s into the 2000s (Straubhaar 2007). So much satellite

use harks back conceptually and technologically to an earlier day of communications development programs when satellite TV was widely promoted in many large developing countries or even large industrializing countries like the United States and the Soviet Union as ideal ways to reach the entire populace with a signal (McAnany 1987).

### **Globalization and Class among Audiences / Users**

Another layer to add to the discussion of multi-layered television and new media is to think about its audience, not so much in the linguistic or cultural geographic terms that we've been speaking about above, but to think about global cultural layers or segments in class terms. At one level, we have the super connected elite of the global media archipelago described above. At the other extreme, in rural parts of Africa and South Asia, there are many people who can barely afford radio or are scarcely covered by very many channels in it (Souto 2005). In terms of global elites, the very best educated and connected, the most likely to speak English and have a strong cultural capital knowledge of global politics and events, are probably major consumers of many globalized channels and spaces, both on satellite/cable TV and the Internet.

Probably the smallest and most elite audiences are for the global news channels, CNN, the BBC, and new would-be global news channel from CCTV (China) or Al-Jazeera. CNN and BBC target political and intellectual elites. That they reach very important groups is true, often important elites in terms of their economic and political importance, but not particularly massive audiences. From my own interviewing in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and various social groups and language groups in Texas, I have observed that the cultural capital as well as the English ability required to actually knowledgeable and enjoyably watch BBC or CNN news on satellite TV or cable is considerable, and rare. For example, in Santo Domingo, in 1987, several people initially told me that CNN was one of the reasons they got cable TV, but on closer examination, almost none of them watched it with any regularity. So even though the idea may interest people, very few people actually have the ability to sustain watching them over time.

Certain other channels with global ambitions have also aimed at liberally educated and wealthier audiences within various nations who have the English-language ability (for those channels that do not yet dub their programming) and the cultural capital and knowledge of the look to find their programming interesting. I interviewed an entrepreneur in Brazil in the late 1980s, who intended to start an American talk show channel in Latin America with shows like Oprah or Phil Donahue. I asked her if she thought she had a big enough target audience to actually make money with across Latin America, people who would know enough to be interested in Opera and Phil Donahue? She was sure she had lots of friends across Latin America who spent quite a bit of time in the USA, who knew English very well, traveled to the U.S. several times a year, etc. What she didn't realize was that even for a regional television channel aimed at a market seemingly as broad as Latin America, she was targeting a very narrow, class-defined group of people. There simply probably weren't enough such people to justify such a satellite channel and, in fact, her channel went bankrupt within a couple of years.

Other channels do successfully target global middle and upper middle classes. It seems that HBO and a certain number of other channels reach middle classes and a certain number of cultural elites who are exceptionally interested in American or European film and television. The initial focus for satellite television by Editora Abril in Brazil in the late 1980s was to provide foreign channels in a variety of languages to former

immigrants and their descendents. However, that audience base was very restricted and marginally profitable. So Abril's system was ultimately sold to its competitor, Murdoch. Interviewing people in the management for HBO in Brazil, Singapore and other regions, I find that with their target audience seems to be people who are cinema fans, not necessarily extraordinary movie collectors, but still people who spend a great deal of their time watching movies, who have the cultural capital and interest to watch a great deal of American film. From my own interviews with cable audiences in Brazil, 1989-2006, this group extends much further into the middle class than does CNN's audience, which makes it more viable as a commercial enterprise and also more likely to have considerable cultural reach and impact.

One of the more interesting genres to rise out of international and global satellite television and cable television is that of the broadly educational, but primarily entertaining documentary: Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, National Geographic, etc. From studies that I have seen in Brazil and elsewhere these seem to reach primarily out to middle classes, or those who aspire to be middle class (Straubhaar 2003), who want to watch something entertaining but also something educational. Interviewing some of the regional management of Discovery Channel in Singapore in 2006, asking them about their balance between entertainment and education, they said that they specifically avoid calling their programming educational, not wanting to make it seem forbidding or uninteresting. They particularly push a combination of sort of good for you, sort of educational, but clearly entertaining and interesting material. This seems to be the adaptation of a documentary genre that national public service television networks had originally created, now broken down into an animal documentary genre, a nature documentary genre, a historical documentary genre, etc. All these genres have been around for a great deal of time, but Discovery Channel seems to have taken them to a more globally diverse, somewhat less nationally specific audience by making them broader and more entertaining. Talking to producers and managers of Discovery in Asia and Latin America, I have found that they are actively aware of the need to blend entertainment value and educational value to the audiences. This has resulted in tremendous global success for Discovery Channel and a proliferation of even more specific documentary channels, particularly in countries in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, which did not have the kind of national public service channels that had done such programs in Japan, North America, and Europe (Chris 2002). Private broadcasters have even brought these new kinds of global entertainment documentaries into Nordic countries, like Finland, where they offer an entertaining way to compete with the more serious documentaries done by public service broadcasters (Hujanen 2007).

Audience studies seem to reflect the same sense of the global documentary genre. For example, one of the first studies of slum dwelling audiences for cable TV in the Rio de Janeiro slum of Rocinha, found that parents there were particularly interested in programming that would keep their kids entertained and safe off the streets, since in their neighborhood the streets was frequently dangerous, with gun battles between drug dealers and police. So the preferred cable channels and genres in that neighborhood were cartoons and entertaining documentaries from Discovery, Animal Planet, etc., which kept kids happily indoors (Letalien 2002).

In contrast to the very global flow of documentaries, MTV is a global satellite TV brand that seems to have succeeded by localizing extensively. It kept core elements of its formula, a focus on youth with a variety of genres of music videos and other kinds of programming, and VJs (video-jockeys) or announcers who adapt MTV styles to local

aesthetics (Chalaby 2002). In Brazil, in the operation I studied most intensely, the initial MTV target in the late 1980s was middle-class and upper-middle-class youth (Flesch 1990). MTV in Brazil initially imagined an audience that would consume the sorts of things that were shown in the videos from the United States, and would have a very direct particular interest in music videos from United States. The producers and researchers for MTV Brazil I interviewed in 1989 and subsequently were very aware of that this was not the majority of Brazilian youth (MTV 1997). Most Brazilian youth would prefer to have seen a higher proportion of Brazilian music videos and fewer American heavy metal and other 1980s U.S.-style videos. However, they were cautious, initially building on the videos they already had from the USA, not wanting to encourage the cost of having a to record new videos, which weren't yet being produced already in Brazil by the music industry in the same way that they were in the United States. So they started with a more cautious mixture of U.S. and Brazilian music videos and appealed to the youth who liked that mixture, upper-class youth with more previous exposure to U.S. culture. As they began to broaden their ambitions to try to reach a broader range of Brazilian youth, they increased the proportion of Brazilian music videos, locally-based interview segments and lifestyle segments etc.

### **A Multi-layered Internet**

The Internet seems to run an extreme range of cultural geographic and other layers of production and identification from very global to very local, much more than broadcast television, satellite television or film. Many people worldwide do use global sites in English, such as the New York Times, Wikipedia, software sites, and games. User registration for the New York Times shows hundreds of thousands of users outside the USA, for example. UNESCO was concerned enough about the dominance of English (and a few other major languages) on the Internet to address the issue of linguistic diversity on the Internet in their Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Unesco 2005) and in subsequent action programs (c.f. UNESCO Information Society Observatory weekly email bulletins).

However, increasingly, more people seem to use language specific sites and services. For example, the English-language version of Wikipedia is popular, drawing hundreds of thousands of global users. What are accelerating even faster, however, are increasing numbers of language versions of Wikipedia. As of August 2007, there are 174 language versions of Wikipedia that have over 100 articles in each as of 2006. Showing some level of concentration in major world languages, 12 language versions of Wikipedia have over 100 thousand entries each (Wikipedia, 2007). Electronic mail, social networking programs, and other new Web 2.0 (or more intensely participatory and interactive Internet uses) tend to function within language groups, within social classes, within religious or other groups. For example, a recent study in the USA shows that even within the seemingly somewhat homogenized U.S. youth culture of the Internet, Facebook social networking program users tend to be somewhat better educated, whiter, more elite, and more college oriented than MySpace users (Boyd 2007). The latter tended to be more working class, more ethnically diverse.

In many cases, many national media Web sites are far more widely used than global media Web sites. Oh My News from Korea, for instance, is one of the world's most heavily used new sites, even though it functions primarily in the Korean language primarily serving a very large and growing base of Korea news users. Likewise in Latin

America and other parts of Asia or Europe, national media sites tend to be somewhat more widely used for actual news purposes than global media sites, which tend to be more likely used for entertainment or other purposes. In Europe, national public service broadcasters' Web sites are often the most heavily used (Hujanen 2007). In some ways, this reflects the trust created by national "brands" of media, often specifically public media, but often, too, private national newspapers. It also relates to the social, cultural and other capital demands made on a user or reader of news (Bourdieu 1986). For someone to knowledgeably read and use the New York Times website for news articles on a regular basis requires intense cultural capital. More than basic knowledge of English, far more than basic knowledge of U.S. and world events, further into U.S. specialized vocabulary, phrases and usages are required for someone to use a new service like the New York Times more than occasionally. If one is to be a regular intensive user, one needs to have the cultural capital required make that both easy and pleasurable.

In fact among the rapidly growing U.S. online news spaces, the most popular spaces are those of extremely localized news portals and services, according to multiple reports at the Eighth Annual International Symposium on Online Journalism, March 30-31, 2007 at the University of Texas in Austin (<http://journalism.utexas.edu/onlinejournalism/>). New services for and about specific neighborhoods, small cities, parts of larger cities like the San Fernando Valley part of Los Angeles, for example, all seem to draw intense, frequent news usage, perhaps when cumulated, more than do larger more cosmopolitan more global sites like the New York Times or the Los Angeles Times. This reinforces our point about the continuing importance of local identity.

### **Transnational Complex**

We need to look more deeply at some of the driving forces behind the growth of complex transnational layers of production, flow and identification. These include the major regional and global diasporic languages, and cultural linguistic markets, both transnational and geocultural, discussed above. They also include the flow and adaptation of capitalist models, global, transnational or regional, and in one key, related development, the growth of major media capitals (Curtin 2003) or production metropolises, and global cities (Sassen 2004).

In many parts of the world, there is a truly globalized capitalism. We see it both at basic level of basic economic forms on into specific media genre forms. It carries with it important cultural forms such as the form of modern American network style of commercial television, or the form of the commercialized music video, or the form of the Western professionalized news story. There are, however, also many regional, national and even local variations. For example, past a very basic level of capitalism itself, is there a single model for the sort of modern or capitalist modernity that many countries throughout the world now pursue? Or are there Japanese and Chinese models of capitalist media modernity, as suggested by Iwabuchi (2002) or David Harvey (2005), which now serve as models for other places in Asia, Latin America, etc. Those may be models that are more approachable and seemingly more realistic than the American, British or French models.

For an interesting example, of over half a century of life now, we can look at the forms of Latin American commercial television broadcasting and, in particular, the way they have produced their most famous product, the telenovela. There, perhaps earlier than anyplace else in the world, we can see the impact of the forms of U.S. style commercial

network broadcasting which have proven so influential in the 1980s and 1990s in places like Europe. Those forms and models landed with full force much earlier in Latin America, with radio in the 1920s and with television already in the 1950s. So already by the 1930s, we saw modern American corporations used to a certain style of highly networked and highly commercialized broadcasting, which they were accustomed to use for selling their products, beginning to use and adapt the same forms to Latin America.

To take a very specific case, Colgate-Palmolive, the major U.S. multinational soap company, helped develop a specific American form of melodrama that we called soap opera in the United States. They quickly moved it to Cuba, the most developed Latin American market, first in radio in the 1930s and then in television in the 1950s, and it spread quickly throughout Latin America. That seems straightforward as a preview of top down capitalist globalization of media and culture, but we look more closely, we actually see a much more complex process. A combination of genre traditions, television industry structures, television producers, and television audiences produced the Latin American telenovela, as a distinct variation on the rather globally dispersed notion of the melodrama, of which the U.S. soap opera is just one notably successful variation. Producers, first in Cuba, then elsewhere in Latin America drew on European serial novel traditions, American radio and television soaps, Cuban and other early Latin American adaptations of those genres, and emerging local and national cultural traditions that lent themselves to melodrama on television (Lopez 1995; La Pastina, Rego et al. 2003). Audience response ensured that advertisers would supply the economic resources for continued and expanded production of telenovelas in an increasing number of countries. Audience feedback shaped the productions away from elite focused dramas toward a mass culture form that resonated more with a variety of traditions and plot devices and that could involve both men and women, peasants, urban workers, and the middle classes (Martín-Barbero, 1993). This cultural formation spread all over Latin America, with distinct adaptations variations, so that Brazilian telenovelas are quite different from those of Mexico (Hernandez, 2001).

In one of life's little ironies, probably Fidel Castro did not consciously intend to accelerate and consolidate the commercial American network form of television in the rest of Latin America when he pushed so many commercial media professionals out of Cuba in 1959. But that was exactly what happened when many highly trained scriptwriters, directors, network managers, network owners, actors and technicians left Cuba for Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Peru. These professionals had their own notions of how to supply the American network model and certain genres like the variety show and telenovela. It was based on the Cuban experience, reflecting the American experience, but quickly developed a number of variations to fit the general Latin American market as well as specific places they worked. They took literally hundreds of thousands of pages of scripts and other concrete formulas that permitted them to move their knowledge with them rather quickly and rather effectively, not unlike the rapid, massive spread of reality shows in the last 10-15 years.

One of my current projects is doing an oral history with Joe Wallach, one of the lead professionals from Time life Inc. who in 1965 went to Brazil to begin a joint venture with Roberto Marinho, the owner of O Globo newspaper and several radio stations, who wished to get into television. I find that he was aware of both the advantages and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses of an American television model as it was taken to Latin America. He realized that certain things about the American model, particularly its financial forms, network simulcasting, and central management would seemingly work

well in Brazil, but he also recognized very quickly by the end of 1965 that some of his U.S. colleagues' ideas about how to program television, principally importing a lot of American programming, would not work. It simply wasn't going to make money. The Time Life TV Globo station was in fourth place out of four in Rio. So he went looking for Brazilian professionals who could bring local programming approaches, which would be more popular with Brazilians. Here is a very early example of how even major pillars of international capitalism recognized the need to localize their strategies and adapt to local forms of capitalist development and of cultural definition of markets. So a key thing that we see in the evolution of current capitalist modernities is the adaptation of these models. This was visible early in Latin America, but also recently in east Asia South Asia, the Arab world and various parts of Europe, to the cultural linguistic and geocultural regions that both local and transnational cultural industries encountered.

We also see the growth of major production centers, media capitals (Curtin 2003) or global production cities. They include Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, and Miami (Sinclair 2003) for Latin America, Hong Kong and Shanghai as major production centers in China, for much of Asia, Beirut and Cairo in the Arab World, etc. These centers have an increasingly global projection, but their real base has been and continues to be transnational geo-cultural and cultural linguistic markets.

### **Multiple Identifications, Identity and Hybridity**

There is an ongoing, complex interaction between forces of economics and technology, as exemplified by many of the satellite television services, broadcast television networks, and Internet companies or institutions discussed above, and long run patterns of culture and language. To some very large degree, people in audiences come to identify with what they are shown. The extraordinary dominance of global film distribution by the USA since the 1920s has resulted in cultural patterns of familiarity, knowledge and liking for American style films that persists in many parts of the world (Miller 2001). That creates a market defined by both political economy and culture that new networks of feature and documentary film, like HBO or Discovery, can exploit, using new technologies of television distribution. Those supply and reinforce the audiences of those who like those genres. So for large numbers of people, a specific identification with Hollywood style film builds up to where there is a layer of culture so familiar to people that Gitlin called this American cultural layer of production, flow and consumption, a familiar second culture for many people in the world (Gitlin 2001).

To take a very different example, the historical primacy of public service broadcasting over time in the Nordic countries and its ongoing creation of genres and forms of content that engage and please its audience has created patterns of goodwill, familiarity, cultural capital or knowledge, and liking that continues to guide audience preferences toward it even when competition is available. From the continued ratings success of such cultural and informational genres in the face of both broadcast and satellite/cable multi-channel TV competition, many Scandinavians seem to have ongoing identification with them that could be seen as fairly stable cultural layers of production, programming and consumption for both informational and cultural forms typically identified with public service broadcasting. To some degree, these forms are identified with national culture and also continue to connect with and reinforce a layer of what might be seen as national identity in a country like Denmark (Søndergaard 2003).

The creation of a certain linguistic or cultural space or market is intertwined with economic and technological forces. In his study of the development of nationalism, Anderson saw print capitalism as work with existing languages or dialects to standardize and spread them, via the printed word of newspapers, novels, etc. to become standardized national languages (Anderson 1983). In his work on modern India, Kumar (2006) shows how Hindi has been both spread and resisted as a national language within India by different institutions of television, at both national and regional levels. By providing ongoing news and culture for people to identify with, a number of these broadcasters, at the level of region or province within India have served to reinforce regional senses of identity, which were already based on earlier forms of language and culture, before television, radio or film.

So the interaction is indeed complex. Audience identification and more aggregated senses of cultural identity change with media forms. Culture is not static. Audience senses of identification can increase as forms of media bring them new and compelling cultural forms to identify with. This is one of the ways that layers of cultural production, flow and identification can increase, reaching the multiple layers presented earlier in this article.

However, ongoing, changing forms of culture (and language) also defines spaces and markets within which use of technologies and orientations of media institutions and businesses is defined. For example, there was a point in the history of television broadcasting in Italy, where somewhat surprisingly large audiences existed for Latin American telenovelas. As channels increased, seeking for new material to program, programmers experimented with the telenovelas and they struck a resonance or identification with parts of the audience to where European scholars began to debate whether counter-flow from the developing to developed nations might be underway (Bilteyst and Meers 2000). However, an underlying preference for locally produced versions of popular television forms could also be seen or anticipated (Straubhaar 1991) and Italian fiction production began to increase, proving profitable, and pushed the telenovelas slowly out of the main parts of the national programming schedule (Buonanno 2004). Still for some parts of the Italian audience, particularly in southern Italy, where many felt more linked with emigration and family ties to countries like Argentina and Brazil, an identification with and liking for such programs continues (Del Negro 2003). These identifications with specific programs again reflect the growth of multiple layers of both identification and identity. These are not essentialized or reified, but must be seen in a steadily changing media and cultural environment where technologies, television institutions, program forms and audience identification and identity evolve together.

This ongoing pattern of change can be seen as both hybridity and the multiplication of layers of production, programming/flow, and identification. The hybridity can be seen in ongoing cultural change through the contact of local, regional, national, transnational and global elements, liked those discussed earlier. Layers of cultural production and identification multiply as technological and economic forces allow. To people I have interviewed in Texas and in Brazil, many of these layers of culture that are made available to them and with which they come to identify, seem very solid, not something they anticipate changing. Latino immigrants to Texas that I have interviewed, as well as Turkish immigrants to western Europe interviewed in research by Ogan (1998), show that many immigrants welcome a certain continuity of culture to be found in television from back home. They cherish that layer of culture and identification, even as they form others in their new environment.



However, these layers of cultural production and flow evolve with technological and economic possibilities. Affordable satellite television channels make it much easier for transnational immigrants to stay more closely involved and identified with their home culture. (Earlier waves of immigrants had fewer media options and were more likely to have to use media in their new hosts countries, if they wanted to use media.) They also evolve with changing, or hybridizing forms of culture, that both reflect and frame the technological and economic possibilities. So as television becomes cheaper, and people also start creating their own cultural forums on websites, we see the growth of Persian language television production in Los Angeles for Iranian immigrants there (Naficy 1993). We see even larger numbers of websites, web radio programs, and even specialized satellite TV channels for South Asian immigrants to the USA or Great Britain, some focused on events back in South Asia, many focused directly on the immigrant experience and news of their own specific community (Mallapragada 2006). These examples show the reciprocity of economic, technology, culture and media channels. People move in large numbers mostly for economic reasons, although political, familial, religious and other reasons factor in as well (Papastergiadis 2000). As they move, they take their culturally formed interests with them. That creates spaces or markets for new layers of media to act in, if economic and technological possibilities allow. All of these ultimately tend to create a new layer of production, experience and reception, that is media, identification and identity specific to the new immigrant community and its culture. That community and culture will represent both a hybridization of home and host cultures, and a new layer of media and culture in itself.

So, to conclude, this article looks at four bodies of issues and theory. First, we see the elaboration and development of new multiple layers of media production, flow, identification and, perhaps, eventually, identity. Second, these form in reciprocal interaction between technological possibilities, political-economic forces such as movement of peoples and expansion of media institutions and companies, and spaces for media created by the cultural identities and interests of concrete groups of people. The net effect of this has been the expansion of layers of production and reception of culture at the global, U.S. export empire, transnational cultural-linguistic, transnational geo-cultural, trans-local, national, regional, global city or media capital, metropolitan and local levels.

Third, instead of the homogenization feared by earlier theorists (Hamelink 1983), we see a less drastic but perhaps equally pervasive hybridization of cultures. Both media institution professionals and audience members I have interviewed tend to articulate what they see as the increase in the number of layers or kinds of culture (often expressed as new markets by the professionals), those layers are also constantly changing as they also interact and hybridize over time. So, fourth, this is also a complex and dynamic system that is constantly evolving or emerging (Straubhaar 2007), as culture, political-economy, and technological possibilities interact and shape each other.

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